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Ordinary common sense suggests that we have just one set of shape concepts that we 
apply  indifferently  on  the  bases  of  sight  and  touch.    Yet  we  understand  the  shape 
concepts,  we  know  what  shape  properties  are,  only  because  we  have  experience  of 
shapes.  And phenomenal experience of shape in vision and phenomenal experience of 
shape in touch seem to be quite different.  So how can the shape concepts we grasp and 
use on the basis of vision be the same as the shape concepts we grasp and use on the basis 
of touch? 
  I think this is the intuitive puzzle that underlies the question sent by the Dublin 
lawyer Molyneux to John Locke.  This concerns a man born blind, who learns by the use 
of his touch to discriminate cubes from spheres.  Suppose him now to gain the use of his 
sight.  And suppose him to be presented with a cube and a sphere, of nighly the same 
bigness.  Quaere, will he be able to tell, by the use of his vision alone, which is the 
sphere, and which the cube?  (Locke 1975, II/ix/8.) 
In his seminal paper ‘Molyneux’s Question’, Gareth Evans agreed in posing the 
underlying issue as a problem about our concepts of shape:  are the concepts grasped and 
used on the basis of vision the same as the concepts grasped and used on the basis of 
touch?  And he gave an argument which aimed to show and explain how it can be that it   2 
is the same shape concepts that we exercise on the basis of vision as on the basis of 
touch.  Evans’ argument uses the notion of an egocentric way of representing space, or 
‘egocentric  space’.  For  present  purposes,  we  can  follow  Evans  in  characterising 
egocentric space as a space defined by the axes up, down, left, right, in front and behind, 
and centred on the subject (cf. Evans 1982, pp. 153-154; Evans 1985, p. 384).  Here are 
the steps of his argument: 
 
(1) Shape concepts have their meaning in virtue of their relations to egocentric space. 
(2) Egocentric space has its content in virtue of its relations to behaviour. 
(3) Egocentric space in vision and in touch has its content in virtue of its relations to the 
very same behavioural repertoire. 
(4) Consequently, egocentric spatial content is of the same type in vision as in touch. 
(5) Since egocentric space is the same in vision as in touch, shape concepts have the same 
content whether they are acquired and used on the basis of vision or on the basis of touch. 
 
Evans presents his conclusion, (5), as addressing the fundamental issue underlying the 
original  Molyneux  question.   The  argument  is  that  if  it  is  the  same  type  of  content, 
egocentric content, that we use indifferently in vision and in touch, and if we apply shape 
concepts on the basis of egocentric content, whether in vision or touch, then it will be true 
that the newly sighted man will be able to say immediately which is the sphere and which 
the cube.  The reason is that he will simply be applying the same concept on the same 
egocentric basis as before.   3 
  Evans was one of the first to introduce the idea that there is a distinction between 
the  type  of  representational  content  used  in  our  thought  and  talk,  which  he  called 
‘conceptual content’, and the kind of content that is involved in biological information-
processing, which he called ‘non-conceptual content’; and he tried to provide principled 
ways of distinguishing them, and a view of their relation to one another.  (See Evans 
1982, index entries under ‘conceptual and non-conceptual content’, especially p. 157.  
For  an  overview  of  the  current  state  of  play,  see  Gunther  2003.)    This  distinction 
immediately bears on the argument sketched above, in steps (1)-(5).  For Evans takes it 
that the problem about shape concepts – about what is going on at the level of conceptual 
content  –  has  to  be  resolved  by  looking  at  the  relation  of  shape  concepts  to  space 
represented  egocentrically  –  which  he  takes  to  be  a  non-conceptual  level  of 
representation.    I  will  review  the  basis  of  this  distinction  between  conceptual  and 
nonconceptual content in §2 below. 
For the moment, we can remark that the key move here, the move that makes all 
this bear on the intuitive puzzle raised by Molyneux’s Question, is that Evans assumes 
that the phenomenal content of perceptual experience is to be given in terms of non-
conceptual content (Evans 1985, pp. 386-388).  The puzzle was to understand how to 
acknowledge that we have a unitary set of shape concepts, exercised indifferently in all 
the  sensory  modalities.    For  experience  of  the  shapes  is  what  provides  us  with  our 
knowledge of what the shape properties are, and the phenomenal character of vision 
seems so different to the phenomenal character of touch (cf. Grice 1962).  In effect, 
Evans gives a way of addressing this question.  Since the egocentric content of visual 
experience is the same as the egocentric content of tactile experience, the two senses can   4 
in  principle  be  making  the  very  same  contribution  to  our  understanding  of  shape 
concepts.  In the relevant respect, then, the phenomenal characters of the two senses are 
the same.  In effect, what happens here is that Evans substitutes a problem about the 
architecture of our information processing and its relation to conceptual thought for a 
problem about the relation of phenomenal experience to conceptual thought. 
  It seems to me, though, that the appeal to non-conceptual content does not give a 
convincing characterisation of the phenomenal content of experience, and I will pursue 
this point below.  Briefly, the problem is that on the face of it, we would expect that an 
account of the basis of conceptual content should yield the result that sameness of content 
will be transparent to the subject.  This is indeed implicit in the above argument, when it 
is assumed that sameness of the shape concepts applied on the basis of sight and of touch 
should mean that the subject realises that it is the same shapes being perceived by sight as 
by touch.  And we would ordinarily assume that sameness of phenomenal content should 
be apparent to the subject.  If two aspects of your experience have the same phenomenal 
content, it should seem to you that they do.  But there is no such transparency of the 
content involved in biological information processing.  The subject need not register, in 
any way or at any level, sameness of the content involved in two biological information-
processing stages. 
  There is a further, related problem in Evans’ discussion.  He seems to assume the 
following  principle:    if  an  information-processing  routine  can  be  applied  to  the 
informational content of one sensory modality, it can also be applied to the informational 
content of any other sensory modality.  So if shape information can be derived from the 
egocentric spatial information in one modality, the subject can equally well derive it from   5 
the egocentric spatial information in another modality.  This principle needs only to be 
spelt our to be seen to be problematic; and it does not help that the sensory information is 
assumed to be part of phenomenal content.  I suspect, however, that what underlies the 
mistake here is a supposition that a phenomenal content is somehow ‘central’ and that the 
computational processes applied to any such content must consequently also be ‘central’ 
and equally applicable to any other phenomenal content. 
I  will  take  up  this  point  in  §4  below,  where  I  look  at  steps  (1)  and  (5),  the 
argument that shape concept have meaning in virtue of their relations to egocentric space.  
It  is,  I  think,  wrong  to  suppose  that  shape  information  is  derived  from  egocentric 
information  in  the  way  that  Evans  supposes;  it  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  shape 
concepts have their meanings in virtue of their relations to egocentric space.  The main 
points I have made in the last two paragraphs arise even if we set that mistake aside.  In 
§5  I  will  argue that  the  relations  of  shape  concepts  to  behaviour  cannot  exhaust  the 
significance of shape concepts, which are concepts of categorical properties. 
In  §§1-3  I  will  discuss  steps  (2)-(4),  in  which  Evans  aims  to  establish  that 
egocentric content is of the same type in vision as in touch.  My aim here is to set out the 
basic problem about the type of content that Evans is supposing we find in perceptual 
experience.  On the one hand, you might take it to be conceptual content, in which case 
whether we have the same contents in different sensory modalities will be transparent to 
the subject; but we lose any picture of the relation of experiential content to the content 
ascribed in information-processing accounts of perception.  Alternatively, you might take 
experiential  content  to  be  the  kind  of  law-governed  content  found  in  information-  6 
processing accounts of perception; but then we have no reason to suppose that sameness 
of content will be transparent to the subject. 
However, Evans offers an argument for the transparent sameness of egocentric 
content in the different sensory modalities which might seem to transcend this dilemma, 
so I begin by looking at it, in §1. 
 
 
1.  Egocentric Space 
 
Evans gives a brief summing up of his argument that egocentric spatial content is the 
same whatever the sensory modality.  The argument is that ‘[t]here is only one egocentric 
space, because there is only one behavioural space’ (Evans 1982, p. 160; cf. Evans 1985, 
pp. 389-390).  The idea here is that each sensory modality has its spatial content in virtue 
of its relations to behaviour.  Moreover, it is not as though each sensory modality has its 
own particular repertoire of behaviours associated with it.  That is, it is not as though 
there is one set of behaviours which are particularly appropriate in response to visual 
input, another set of behaviours which are responses to auditory input, and so on.  Rather, 
there is a single set of behaviours which are suitable as responses to spatial perceptual 
input in whatever sensory modality.  Evans thinks that this establishes that egocentric 
spatial content is the same in all sensory modalities. 
  To evaluate this line of argument, let us begin with the idea that egocentric space 
has its content in virtue of its relations to behaviour.  I think that there is a confusion 
which can make this idea seem more straightforward than it is.  Suppose we consider a   7 
submarine  commander  who,  let’s  assume,  uses  latitude  and  longitude  co-ordinates  in 
instructing the ship’s computer and navigation systems as to just how the craft should 
move.  It is, we suppose, quite a sophisticated submarine, which at the highest level of 
control uses only latitude and longitude co-ordinates.  Moreover, we can suppose that 
most of the information the commander has about where he is and where he wants to go 
comes  in  the  form  of  latitude  and  longitude  co-ordinates.    In  that  case,  latitude  and 
longitude play a special role in navigating the ship.  But that does not mean that this co-
ordinate system has its meaning in virtue of its role in the control of the submarine.  
Rather, the co-ordinate system has its meaning entirely prior to its use in navigation, and 
this prior meaning is exploited when the system is used in control of the submarine. 
It seems quite plausible that egocentric space plays a special role in our ordinary 
high-level control of our own movements.  And it seems quite plausible that very often, 
the information that the subject has from perception about the location of this or that 
target comes in egocentric form.  So egocentric space may play just the kind of role in the 
control of spatial action that I just envisaged for latitude and longitude in the case of the 
submarine.  But in this case too, it does not follow that egocentric spatial terms have their 
contents in virtue of their role in the direction of action.  It remains possible that the 
egocentric terms have their meanings in virtue of some quite separate range of facts. 
  Notice, incidentally, that the latitude and longitude system is being used at the 
highest level of decision-making.  It may well be that the execution of a command to 
move to a particular destination will mean that a lot of computing machinery has to 
operate.  It may be that this will involve translation from the high-level command into 
lower-level  frames  of  reference  used  in  more  immediate  control  of  the  submarine’s   8 
steering system.  Ultimately, indeed, the instructions issued may be entirely non-spatial - 
simply to fire one or another engine, for example.  The commander may know nothing of 
exactly what is going on at these lower levels.  And the meaning of the latitude and 
longitude system is still not given in terms of its relations to these lower levels. 
  It may be that the  submarine commander can be said to possess the latitude-
longitude system of representation only in virtue of the fact that it plays a role in the 
explanation of his behaviour.  Similarly, someone might be said to posses an egocentric 
system of representation only in virtue of the role that the system plays in the explanation 
of his behaviour.  But it neither case would it follow that the content of either system of 
representation,  the  latitude-longitude  system  or  the  egocentric  system,  had  to  be 
explained in terms of its connections with behaviour. 
 
 
At any rate, whatever the motivation for the idea, what are the implications of 
supposing that egocentric spatial content is actually constituted by its implications for 
behaviour?  The natural way to implement that idea would be to suppose that identifying 
the egocentric location of an object is identifying something like an affordance of the 
object, in the sense of Gibson 1979.  That is, knowing the egocentric location of the thing 
is a matter of knowing that it affords grasping if you move thus-and-so, that it affords 
avoidance  if  you  move  thus-and-so,  and  so  on.    And  the  same  affordance  has  to  be 
presented in the same way to the subject, whichever sensory modality is used in finding 
out about it, since the subject only has one behavioural repertoire.   9 
  What  is  doing  the  work  here  is  the  idea  that  the  same  affordances  are  being 
identified in the very same ways:  that is, they are being identified from the perspective of 
the agent who may be acting to use them.  So if both vision and touch, for example, 
represent  an  object  as  being  just  to  one’s  right,  they  are  both,  on  this  account, 
representing the object as ‘reachable thus-and-so’.  And the ‘thus-and-so’ has to be spelt 
out  in  the  same  way  both  times,  this  argument  continues,  because  in  both  cases  the 
reaching is being specified in just the same way, from the viewpoint of the agent who 
may execute it. 
  If we accept this interpretation of the suggestion that egocentric spatial content is 
constituted by its implications for behaviour, we can see the force of Evans’ argument 
that ‘there is only one egocentric space, because there is only one behavioural space’.  
The  idea  here  is  that  egocentric  content  identifies  the  locations  of  objects  merely  as 
affordances.  But there is only one set of affordances provided by the egocentric location 
of an object, no matter how through which modality the location is identified.  This is the 
force of the point that there are not different behaviours associated with each sensory 
modality.  The idea is that whatever the sensory modality, identification of the location of 
an object is always identification of it as providing the very same set of affordances.  It is 
for this reason that egocentric space has to be the same, whatever the modality. 
 
 
  The trouble with this gloss on the content of egocentric identifications of location 
is  that  we  would  ordinarily  take  spatial  location  to  be  the  categorical  basis  of  these 
affordances.  That is, we think that it is the relative locations of the thing and the agent   10 
that explain why it is possible for the agent to act on the thing.  We do not suppose that 
egocentric location is actually constituted by the possibility of the agent acting on the 
thing.  This comes out when we consider the relation between the basic egocentric frame, 
and other systems of reference to places.  It probably is true that initially, perception 
merely identifies the locations of objects in a basic egocentric frame, in which locations 
are specified in terms merely of their relations to the subject, and not in terms of their 
relations to one another.  It is this basic system of identifications that you might take to be 
a set of identifications of Gibsonian affordances.  But we can also operate with egocentric 
terms, using an egocentric frame that is centred not on oneself, but on an arbitrary object 
one can see.  For example, I might say that ‘the window is to the right of the door’, and 
this may be true even though the window and the door are both on my left.  In this case, 
there may be no assumption that the door itself has an intrinsic right or left; rather, I take 
my own right or left, and project them onto the door, using it as a reference object.  
Linguists describe this as use of a deictic frame of reference (cf. Garnham 1989).  It can 
also happen, though, that I identify locations in terms of the egocentric frame generated 
by the axes of an object other than myself, such as another person, or a car, for example.  
So I might say that my bicycle is in front of and slightly to the left of a car that you and I 
can both see.  Linguists describe this as use of an intrinsic frame of reference (Garnham 
1989).  The first point to notice about deictic and intrinsic place-identifications is that 
they can straightforwardly be derived from basic egocentric information about where the 
various objects are with respect to me, together perhaps with some information about the 
shapes of the objects, from which their intrinsic axes can be derived.  Indeed that seems   11 
to be why we find it so easy, in ordinary vision, to find deictic and intrinsic locations of 
seen objects. 
  The point now about deictic and intrinsic identifications of places is that they are 
rich in causal significance.  It might be that the relation of the door to the window has 
implications for the structural safety of the building.  Or the relation of my bicycle to the 
car might affect how safe the bicycle is from being flattened by the car.  But these causal 
implications  of  location  can’t  be  derived  from  the  affordances  I  described  earlier, 
concerning how I myself should go about reaching or avoiding seen objects.  The natural 
reading of the situation is that the basic egocentric identifications of location are the 
grounds of affordances, rather than being constituted by these affordances, and that from 
these grounds of affordances we can determine further spatial relations, which ground 
further causal implications. 
  If, however, we think of egocentric locations as the grounds of affordances, then 
on the face of it, we lose the argument that the spatial  contents of different sensory 
modalities must be identifying the same affordances in the  same ways.  We have to 
acknowledge that it is possible that a single egocentric location could be identified in two 
quite different ways, yet still be grounding the very same possibilities of behaviour.  That 
is, a subject could be identifying locations in one way by vision, and in a different way by 
hearing, and yet these two different ways of identifying locations could ground the very 
same behavioural reactions; they could ground the ascription to the object of the very 
same sets of affordances.  The difference between the identifications of places in the two 
sensory modalities would emerge in the fact that it could still be informative for the 
subject to find that it is the same range of places that is being identified by vision as by   12 
hearing.    Of  course,  the  subject  might  be  expected  to  recognise  that  the  place-
identifications  in  the  two  modalities  typically  ground  the  very  same  behavioural 
responses, and that those responses are typically equally successful whether bases on 
vision or on hearing.  And this means that the subject would have available an inference 
to the best explanation, which would argue that it must be the very same range of places 
that is being identified by vision as by hearing, since the very same behaviours as yield 
success in response to visual input also yield success in response to the auditory input.  
But that implies that we are dealing with different ways of identifying places in the 
different sensory modalities, so that it is a substantive inference to the best explanation 
that determines that it is the same range of places that is being identified in these different 
ways.  If it really were transparently obvious that it is the same range of places being 
identified  by  vision  as  by  hearing,  there  would  be  no  scope  for  there  to  be  such  an 
inference to the best explanation.  The identity of the places identified through vision and 
hearing would simply be guaranteed by the mode of place-identification used. 
 
 
2.  Conceptual vs. Non-conceptual Content 
 
Suppose we were to accept that there is a sameness of egocentric spatial content across 
sensory modalities.  Under what circumstances would this sameness of content mean that 
the sameness of the places identified in the different modalities was transparent to the 
subject?  I think we can focus this problem by drawing a distinction between two types of 
content:  on the one hand, the information-processing content which scientists use in   13 
characterising the operations brain systems involved in perception, for example, and on 
the  other  hand,  the  kind  of  conceptual  content  that  we  ascribe  to  each  other  in  our 
everyday commonsense talk about beliefs and desires and so on.  The kind of content in 
which Evans was interested was supposed to be the content of consciousness, not merely 
brain  states,  and  to  be  non-conceptual.    But  I  think  we  can  triangulate  the  kind  of 
phenomenal content he was after by comparing it to these other two types. 
  There do seem to be quite sharp differences between these two other types of 
content.  Consider the question why cognitive science ascribes content to brain systems at 
all.  It is after all often argued that this is in itself a mistake, that states of the brain cannot 
literally represent aspects of the external environment.  If we want to characterise brain 
states, why not simply describe the anatomy and physiology and leave it at that?  One 
traditional reason for not leaving it there is that cognitive science seems to have found 
laws – rough and ready, ceteris paribus laws no doubt, but laws nonetheless – which are 
stated at the level of content.  That is, we can for example describe human hearing as 
performing a kind of processing to establish the location of a sound, and the description 
may be stated at the level of content.  There are laws dealing with the kinds of illusions 
and  breakdowns  to  which  such  a  system  is  prone.    And  these  laws  are  relatively 
indifferent to the details of the physiology of the system in which they are realised.  They 
would apply equally to a different species, with a quite different physiology to ours, 
which  had  nonetheless,  and  perhaps  for  similar  reasons,  developed  auditory  systems 
working on similar principles. 
  It is important to note that, as has frequently been observed since Fodor 1983, 
there is a certain modular organisation to the brain systems studied by scientists  (cf.   14 
Coltheart  1999).    For  present  purposes,  we  can  take  modularity  to  be  a  matter  of 
informational encapsulation – that is, that information processed within one system is not 
generally  available  to  all  other input  systems  –  and  domain  specificity  –  that  is,  the 
various input systems are processing different sets of initial raw data.  And for present 
purposes, we can acknowledge that the conformity of input systems to this rough working 
definition may be a matter of degree.  That is, there may be some overlap in the raw data 
being processed by different systems, and there on occasion be some capacity for one 
system to make use of information processed by another system.  The present point is that 
the laws governing the processing of contents of a particular kind will, in general, be 
module-specific.  That is:  suppose, for example, you are told that there is somewhere in 
the subject’s brain, a representation of a particular stimulus as at a particular location..  
The  significance  of  this  representation  will  depend  on  the  laws  governing  the  inputs 
which can produce such a representation and the outputs which such a representation can 
generate,  perhaps  in  conjunction  with  other  representations.    So  you  only  know  the 
significance of the subject’s brain having a representation of the location of a stimulus 
when you know what the relevant laws are.  But the relevant laws will be, as I shall say, 
‘module-specific’.  That is, you will know the significance of the subject’s brain having 
that representation of the location of a stimulus only when you know in which module the 
representation  figures.    There  is  no  general  presumption  that  representations  will  be 
processed  in  the  very  same  way,  in  whatever  modules  they  figure.    So  to  grasp  the 
significance of the subject’s brain having that representation of the location of a stimulus, 
we need to know in which module the representation figures and we need to know the 
laws governing the processing of representations within that module.   15 
  Of course, the outputs from one module will often be the inputs to one or more 
other modules, so we cannot say that the only relevant laws are those governing the 
processing of contents within modules; we do also need to acknowledge the existence of 
laws about the relations between the outputs of one system and the inputs to another.  In 
effect we have already noticed the existence of these kinds of connections, when we 
considered the ways in which vision can  calibrate touch.  And we will also have to 
acknowledge the importance of laws about the relations between external stimuli, input 
systems and the environmental effects of actions based on processing. 
  In contrast to the contents ascribed to information-processing modules, there are 
the contents ascribed in common-sense psychology, when we attribute particular thoughts 
and speech-acts to one another.  These are generally taken to be subject to a battery of a 
priori constraints; certainly they are taken by Evans to be so.  In particular, there is what 
Evans called the ‘Intuitive Criterion of Difference’ governing the ascription of conceptual 
contents: 
 
the thought associated with one sentence S as its sense must be different from the 
thought  associated  with  another  sentence  S  as  its  sense,  if  it  is  possible  for 
someone to understand both sentences at a given time while coherently taking 
different  attitudes  towards  them,  i.e.  accepting  (rejecting)  one  while  rejecting 
(accepting), or being agnostic about, the other. 
(Evans 1982, p. 19) 
   16 
So if two sentences express the same thought, it must be immediately recognisable by the 
subject, in the sense that the subject cannot coherently take conflicting attitudes towards 
them. 
  This  immediately  marks  a  point  of  contrast  between  conceptual  contents  and 
information-processing  contents.    When  two  information-processing  contents  are 
contents in different modular systems, there is no guarantee that their sameness of content 
must be registered in any way or at any level.  They may simply be in different modules, 
with their significance regulated by quite different sets of laws. 
  Moreover,  even  within  a  single  module,  since  we  are  dealing  only  with  the 
empirically discovered laws governing the processing of information within that module, 
there  will  be  no  a  priori  guarantee  that  within  the  module,  there  could  not  be  two 
tokenings of the very same single content – say to the effect that a particular stimulus is 
at a given location – such that within the module there was acceptance of one token 
content and rejection or agnosticism about the other. 
  We  can  see  the  difference  between  information-processing  contents  and 
conceptual  contents very plainly if we consider the phenomenon of asymmetric cross-
modal transfer of learning.  Streri describes the phenomenon as follows: 
 
At the age of 5 months, babies show haptic recognition of the shape of objects 
which they have already seen, but it has not been possible to observe the reverse 
transfer. 
(Streri, 1993, p. 130; cf. Streri and Pecheux, 1986) 
   17 
These  findings  are  puzzling  if  we  take  ourselves  to  be  dealing  here  with  conceptual 
contents in vision and in touch, which must now be assumed to be identical, to  explain 
the ability of the infants to recognise haptically the shapes they have seen, and now 
assumed not to be identical, to explain the inability to recognise visually the shapes they 
have  explored  haptically.    The  findings  are,  however,  relatively  unproblematic, 
conceptually at any rate, if we take ourselves to be dealing with information-processing 
contents governed by laws which may vary over time as the child matures.  We have 
simply  discovered  something  about  the  empirical  laws  governing  the  contents  in 
question. 
  Evans  is  emphatic  that  the  egocentric  spatial    content  of  the  senses  is  not 
conceptual content.  So there is no reason to suppose that egocentric content will be 
subject to the ‘Intuitive Criterion of Difference’:  it could be that two spatial contents 
were the same yet the subject could rationally assess them in conflicting ways.  And if we 
think  of  egocentric    content  as  law-governed,  module-specific  content,  then  there  is 
positive reason to dispute the idea that sameness of content in different modules must be 
transparent to the subject.  Even if content, in this sense, is ‘subjectively available’ to the 
subject, there is no reason, so far, to suppose that sameness or difference of egocentric 
content in different sensory systems must be transparent to the subject. 
 
 
3.  The Contents of Experience 
   18 
I think the fact is that the notion of a non-conceptual content of experience comes under 
great pressure at this point.  On the one hand, it is supposed to be a kind of foundation for 
conceptual content, and when we reflect on that, it can easily seem that sameness or 
difference of non-conceptual content must be transparent to the subject.  Consider, for 
example, a demonstrative like ‘there’, referring to a perceived place.  This is conceptual 
identification of a place, and when we refer on the basis of vision to a place, and then 
refer on the basis of touch to the very same place, the sameness of conceptual content has 
to  be  grounded  in  a  sameness  of  non-conceptual  content.    And  since  the  conceptual 
demonstratives are subject to the Intuitive Criterion of Difference, this makes it look as 
though  sameness  of  the  place  identified  must  be  apparent  to  the  subject.    And  that 
transparent sameness of place can only be grounded in a transparent sameness of place at 
the level of non-conceptual content. 
  The problem is that the non-conceptual content of experience is usually thought to 
be content of the very same kind as is ascribed in information-processing accounts of 
perception.  The idea is that this kind of information-processing content at some point 
becomes ‘subjectively available’, and that a discovery of this point is what will make the 
link between ordinary subjective experience and scientific accounts of perception.  This 
is all but explicit in the very idea of a ‘neural correlate of consciousness’:  the idea is that 
conscious experience has a certain representational content, and brain-processing has a 
certain  representational  content,  and  what  is  sought,  by  those  looking  for  a  neural 
correlate of consciousness, is the point at which the content of the brain processing is the 
very  same  as  the  content  of  experience.    But  this  just  requires  that  the  content  of 
consciousness should be content of the very same type as information-processing content.    19 
And  as  I  have  been  stressing,  content  of  this  type,  co-ordinate  with  module-specific 
information-processing  laws,  is  not  in  general  transparent:    sameness  of  this  type  of 
content need not be apparent to the subject. 
  Evans himself gives a vivid characterisation of the relation between the content of 
conscious experience, information-processing content and conceptual content, as follows: 
 
we  arrive  at  conscious  perceptual  experience  when  sensory  input  is  not  only 
connected to behavioural dispositions in the way I have been describing – perhaps 
in some phylogenetically more ancient part of the brain – but also serves as the 
input to a thinking, concept-applying and reasoning system; so that the subject’s 
thoughts,  plans  and  deliberations  are  also  systematically  dependent  on  the 
informational properties of the input.  When there is such a further link, we can 
say that the person, rather than just some part of his brain, receives and possesses 
the information. 
(Evans 1982, p. 158; cf. Evans 1985, p. 387) 
 
Although the passage is not fully explicit, the natural reading is that experiential content 
is the very same content as brain-processing content, only it is brain-processing content 
that is input into a ‘thinking, concept-applying and reasoning system’.  We can, that is, 
make sense of counterfactuals such as ‘if this content had not been input into a thinking, 
concept-applying and reasoning system, then it would have been mere brain-processing 
content and not conscious at all.’   20 
  Just to emphasise the main point here:  Evans is operating with a single generic 
notion of non-conceptual, informational content, which he uses in characterising both the 
deliverances of conscious perception, and the information-processing carried out by the 
brain.  His characterisation of the spatial content of auditory input, for example, is a 
characterisation of this generic notion of content: 
 
auditory input – or rather that complex property of auditory input which encodes 
the direction of sound – acquires a non-conceptual spatial content for an organism 
by being linked with behavioural output in, presumably, an advantageous way. 
(Evans 1982, p. 156) 
 
And he glosses the account as follows: 
 
So  far  I  have  been  considering  the  non-conceptual  content  of  perceptual 
informational states.  Such states are not ipso facto perceptual experiences – that 
is, states of a conscious subject …. it seems abundantly clear that evolution could 
throw up an organism in which such advantageous links were established, long 
before it had provided us with a conscious subject of experience. 
(Evans 1982, pp. 157-158) 
 
Since there is, of course, a distinction between the case in which non-conceptual content 
is not the content of an experience, and the case in which the non-conceptual content is 
the  content  of  an  experience,  this  raises  the  question  how  that  distinction  is  to  be   21 
explained.  And it is here that Evans appeals to his idea that the content is the content of 
conscious perceptual experience when it is not only connected to behavioural dispositions 
in the ‘advantageous’ way indicated, but is also ‘the input to a thinking, concept-applying 
and reasoning system’ (p. 158).  But, by his own lights, Evans has given the constitutive 
account of this generic type of content in advance of any appeal to consciousness or its 
being input to a thinking, concept-applying and reasoning system. 
This  point  is  indeed  driven  home  in  his  discussion  of  Molyneux’s  Question, 
where, as we have seen, his whole point is that we can appeal to the way in which non-
conceptual spatial content is constituted by its links to behaviour, in advance of any 
appeal being made to the way in which this content is linked to the thinking, concept-
applying and reasoning system, in order to establish that the spatial concepts are shared 
across the modalities. 
Incidentally,  Evans  uses  the  same  general  strategy  in  arguing  that  conceptual 
thought, unlike the content of conscious experience, must conform to what he calls the 
Generality  Constraint.    His  idea  here  is  that  conceptual  thought  is  subject  to  the 
requirement that anyone capable of grasping the thought that a is F must also be capable 
of grasping the thoughts that b is F, that c is F, and so on, for all the other suitable 
singular ways of thinking they understand; and they must be capable of thinking that a is 
G, that a is H, and so on, for every other suitable predicative concept they grasp.  But the 
non-conceptual content of experience is subject to no such constraint: 
 
It  is  one  of  the  fundamental  differences  between  human  thought  and  the 
information-processing  that  takes  place  in  our  brains  that  the  Generality   22 
Constraint applies to the former but not to the latter.  When we attribute to the 
brain  computations  whereby  it  localizes  the  sounds  we  hear,  we  ipso  facto 
attribute to it representations of the speed of sound and of the distance between 
the ears, without any commitment to the idea that it should be able to represent 
the speed of light or the distance between anything else. 
(Evans 1982, p. 104) 
 
Without any further argument, Evans then takes it for the remainder of the book that the 
content  of  perception,  whether  conscious  or  not,  is  not  subject  to  the  Generality 
Constraint.  This procedure only makes sense on the supposition that we are here dealing 
with a single generic notion of non-conceptual content, which can be used equally in 
connection with conscious and non-conscious states.  Since Evans aims to derive the 
distinctive characteristics of conceptual thought from the fact that it meets the Generality 
Constraint, he could hardly acknowledge that the content of conscious perception meets 
the Generality Constraint without maintaining that the content of conscious perception 
too is conceptual.  But the passage just quoted is the only argument he feels obliged to 
give for the claim that the content of conscious perception is not subject to the Generality 
Constraint; and this procedure only makes sense on the supposition of a single generic 
notion of non-conceptual content. 
  On this interpretation, then, the content of experience is the same as the content of 
information-processing  brain  systems.    The  problem  is  now  that  as  we  have  seen, 
sameness  of  the  contents  produced  by  information-processing  in  different  sensory 
modalities will not in general be transparent to the subject, even if those contents are   23 
contents of experience.  For the module-specific laws which govern those contents will 
not in general guarantee transparency. 
  You might argue that the guarantee of transparency comes just because the non-
conceptual content is input a ‘thinking, concept-applying and reasoning system’.  If the 
same concept is applied in response to non-conceptual input in two different sensory 
modalities, then the transparency of conceptual content implies that it will be apparent to 
the  subject  that  it  is  the  same  external  property  or  particular  that is  being  perceived 
through the two sensory modalities.  But that reaction stands Evans’ approach on its head.  
The whole point of Evans’ approach was to ground the transparent unity of our shape 
concepts in the transparent unity of egocentric space.  Suppose for a moment that the 
transparent unity of egocentric space is somehow grounded in the transparent sameness 
of the concepts we apply on the basis of sight and touch.  That means that we have lost 
the explanation Evans set out in the 5-step argument with which I began, whose point 
was to explain how it can be that we are applying the very same shape concepts on the 
bases of sight as of touch.  The whole strategy was to establish transparent sameness of 
egocentric content across the different sensory modalities, and argue that this was the 
basis for the transparent unity of the shape concepts we use.  This is evident in Evans 
1982,  where  the  transparent  unity  of  egocentric  space  is  argued  for  without  shape 
concepts  being  mentioned  at  all.    Or,  to  put  it  another  way,  if  we  begin  with  the 
assumption that egocentric space has no transparent unity in advance of the content being 
input to a ‘thinking, concept-applying and reasoning system’, we will not be  able to 
establish the unity of the shape concepts we actually have merely by saying that they are 
responses to egocentric content.   24 
  I think the truth is that it is a mistake to approach this topic by identifying the 
content of conscious experience with either conceptual content or information-processing 
content.  We have to acknowledge that there is such a thing as the phenomenal content of 
experience, and that it is related to conceptual  content and to information-processing 
content.  But phenomenal content does not have to be identified with either conceptual or 
information-processing content.  On the face of it, there are three quite different sets of 
phenomena here - conceptual content, information-processing content, and phenomenal 
content - and we ought simply to articulate their relations to one another without feeling 
compelled to provide reductions. 
  Which relations ought we to be considering?  We have to acknowledge that the 
conscious experience of a subject is causally explained, in part at any rate, by the content 
of the information-processing carried out in that subject’s brain.  Part of the reason why 
the subject has a conscious experience with this particular phenomenal content is that the 
brain-processing had a particular informational content.  There must further be causal-
explanatory relations between the subject’s conceptual judgements and the contents of 
the underlying brain-processing.  The whole methodology of cognitive science as applied 
to human subjects depends on the idea that their verbal reports, which presumably are in 
general conceptual, can be explained in part by the contents of the underlying brain-
processing in various more or less modular sub-systems.  So there are certainly relations 
between  information-processing  content  and  phenomenal  content,  and  between 
information-processing contents and phenomenal contents. 
What about the relations between phenomenal content and conceptual content?  
As I began this essay by saying, it seems to me that this is the really difficult issue raised   25 
by Molyneux’s Question.  On the face of it, the phenomenal contents of our experiences 
in different sensory modalities are quite different – isn’t that why it is generally apparent 
to us whether we are seeing or touching an object?  And on the face of it, we have the 
shape concepts we do because of our experiences of shape.  We do not think of shapes 
merely as hypothetical possessors of various functional roles; rather, we take it that in 
experience we encounter the categorical properties themselves.  How then could it be 
possible for us to acquire and use the very same shape concepts on the basis of vision as 
on touch, given the apparent differences in the phenomenal contents of sight and touch? 
  Since this is plainly a difficult question, it is natural to do what Evans does, and 
replace it with a more tractable problem about the architecture of perceptual information-
processing in various modalities, and its relation to conceptual thought.  This exercise is 
actually helpful in addressing the harder problem, just because of the relations I have 
already  remarked  between  information-processing  and  phenomenal  experience,  and 
between information-processing and conceptual thought.  But the exercise will not in 
itself constitute a solution to the Molyneux problem. 
  On  this  understanding,  then,  let  us  finally  look  at  Evans’  picture  of  the 
information-processing architecture, and its relation to our concepts of shape.  It seems to 
me  that  this  picture  is  instructively  mistaken.    There  are  morals  here  for  anyone 
attempting an assault on the Molyneux problem. 
 
 
4. Shape Concepts and Egocentric Space 
   26 
As I said at the outset, Evans seems to operate on the assumption that if an information-
processing  procedure  can  be  applied  to  the  conscious  content  of  any  one  sensory 
modality, then it can be applied to the conscious content of any sensory modality.  There 
is no basis for this assumption.  If we are assuming that the phenomenal  content of 
sensory experience is information-processing content, then the computational processes 
applied to that content may be module-specific; there is no reason in general to suppose 
that an operation which can be carried out within one modular system can equally be 
carried out within all modular systems.  Discussing this issue is a little bit complicated 
here, because the example we have to deal with is Evans’ idea that the subject somehow 
derives  information  about  the  shapes  of  the  objects  perceived  from  egocentric 
information about the locations of their parts.  The idea is that if the subject perform this 
computation within one sensory modality, then it must be possible for the subject to 
execute the computation within any other sensory modality that provides such egocentric 
spatial information.   I think the real problem is the idea that this computational procedure 
must be general-purpose, rather than modality-specific, because it is being applied to 
contents  of  consciousness.    What  complicates  matters  is  that  it  does  not  seem  right 
anyway to  say that we derive  shape information from egocentric spatial information.  
Here is what Evans says about this:   
 
When we think of a blind man synthesising the information he receives by  a 
sequence of haptic perceptions of a chair into a unitary representation, we can 
think of him ending the process by being in a complex informational state which 
embodies information concerning the egocentric location of each of the parts of   27 
the chair; the top over there, to the right (here, he is inclined to point or reach 
out), the back running from there to here, and so on.  Each bit of the information 
is  directly  manifestable  in  his  behaviour,  and  is  equally  and  immediately 
influential upon his thoughts.  One, but not the only, manifestation of this latter 
state of affairs is the subject’s judging that there is a chair-shaped object in front 
of him. 
  We started off by thinking about what is involved in perceptions which 
specify the egocentric position of a stimulus, and we find that we have captured 
perceptions which convey, at least in a rudimentary way, shape or figure – i.e. 
perceptions upon the basis of which shape concepts could be applied. 
(Evans 1985, 389) 
 
Presumably  Evans  does  not  suppose  that  we  find  the  shapes  of  objects  by  articulate 
verbal reasoning based on knowledge of the egocentric locations of their parts.  This 
crucial passage seems to be suggesting rather a sub-personal computation for finding 
shapes.  It is not here made fully explicit how the computation of shape from egocentric 
location is supposed to go.  The suggestion seems to be that the computation begins with 
the parts of the object – presumably specified as already possessing their own particular 
shapes – and that the shape of the object as a whole is derived from this information 
together with information about the egocentric locations of the parts.  So, for example, 
consider the similarities and differences between the shapes of a teacup and a bucket.  
The teacup has as parts a bowl and a handle at its side.  The bucket has as parts a bowl 
and a handle over the op.  Evans’ proposal would then be that the relation between the   28 
handle and the bowl of the teacup is derived from information about their respective 
egocentric locations.  Similarly, the relation between the handle and the bowl of the 
bucket  is  derived  from  knowledge  of  their  respective  egocentric  locations.    We  can 
contrast this with a theory in which the relations between the bowl and the handle in these 
two cases are given in an object-centred frame of reference, using primitive such as ‘over 
the mouth of the bowl’, or ‘down one side of the bowl’.  There seems to be no particular 
reason to suppose that the derivation of this kind of information has to go in the way 
Evans  envisages  (cf.,  e.g.,  Bruce  et.  al.  1996,  chapter  9,  ‘Object  Recognition’,  for  a 
review of the possibilities here). 
Suppose,  for  a  moment,  though,  that  Evans’  picture  is  correct  and  that  shape 
information is derived from egocentric information in touch.  And suppose that we have a 
subject capable of deriving shape information from egocentric tactual information, as 
Evans must suppose Molyneux’s newly sighted man to be.  And suppose that this subject 
does also have egocentric visual content, and that this is transparently the same as his 
tactual egocentric content.  It still does not follow that this subject would be capable of 
identifying shapes on the basis of vision.  For the ability to extract shape information 
from  egocentric  information  could  still  be  modality  specific;  that  is,  the  capacity  to 
perform this kind of derivation might be something that the subject has in relation to 
touch, but not in relation to vision. 
To see this it may help to consider a case in which spatial information really is 
derived  from  egocentric  spatial  information,  so that  something  like  Evans’  picture  is 
correct.  Suppose we go back to the distinction I drew in §1 above between a basic 
egocentric frame, on the one hand, and the use of deictic and intrinsic reference frames   29 
on the other.  So, for example, when I look around me and see where everything is, for 
the purposes of reaching and grasping myself, I am making use of basic egocentric visual 
information.  In effect, I see where objects are in relation to me, but I am not concerned 
with their spatial relations to one another.  If, however, you ask me where the tennis 
racket is, I might say, ‘It is to the right of the ball’, and here I am projecting my own left 
and right onto the ball and using that deictic frame of reference to locate the ball.  And 
when I say ‘The racket is on Bill’s left’, I am using Bill’s intrinsic axes to generate a 
frame  of  reference,  and  locating  the  racket  in  that  frame  of  reference.    Now  these 
computations of deictic and intrinsic locations are performed ‘on demand’ by the visual 
system.  They have to be derived from the basic egocentric information one has in vision, 
they are not performed automatically:  you have to look to see whether the racket is on 
Bill’s left, for instance.  (See Logan 1995 for detailed development of this point.)  But it 
is not, either, as though the determination of deictic and intrinsic locations is a matter of 
explicit calculation by the subject.  The subject does not, for example, have to engage in 
verbal reasoning to find deictic and intrinsic locations:  it really is a visual matter.  The 
subject has only to look to find out the deictic and intrinsic locations of things. 
So this case seems to meet a part, at any rate, of Evans’ picture:  deictic and 
intrinsic locations are being derived from basic egocentric locations.  And this derivation 
is a perceptual matter.  Suppose now that we have a subject who can find deictic and 
intrinsic locations on the basis of vision alone.  And suppose that this subject also has 
tactual  information  about  the  egocentric  locations  of  the  various  objects  around  him.  
Would it follow from this that the subject is able to use this basic egocentric information 
in touch to find the deictic and intrinsic locations of things?  Evans’ answer is that the   30 
subject is bound to be able to do so.  He is arguing that a subject who can extract shape 
information  from  egocentric  visual  information  must  also  be  able  to  extract  shape 
information from egocentric tactual information, if it is transparently the same egocentric 
information that is presented in both sensory modalities.  Just so, a subject who can find 
deictic and intrinsic locations on the basis of vision alone ought to be able to perform the 
very same operations to find deictic and intrinsic locations on the basis of touch. 
Once we have set out the reasoning here explicitly, it is evident that there is a 
problem.  The problem is that the computational procedure that is being used to derive 
the deictic or intrinsic information about location may be modality-specific.  That is, the 
computational procedure may be available for the deliverances of vision but not for the 
deliverances of touch.  It seems entirely possible that there could be a subject who could 
find deictic and intrinsic locations on the basis of specifically visual attention alone, but 
who could not compute deictic and intrinsic locations on the basis of touch alone, even 
though touch provided basic egocentric information. 
  I think it is easy to see the picture that Evans is using here.  He is taking it that 
after visual or tactual information-processing becomes conscious, once we are at the level 
at  which  the  information-processing  contents  are  ‘subjectively  available’,  any  further 
operations  performed  on  the  now  conscious  contents  cannot  be  modality-specific  but 
must  be  general-purpose,  central-system  operations.    And  that  seems  simply  to  be  a 
mistake.  It is true that verbal reasoning applied by the subject to information he has in 
perceptual awareness seems to be general-purpose.  Any verbal reasoning I can perform 
on my visual information is also reasoning I could apply to transparently similar tactual 
information.  But the sub-personal processing applied to visual egocentric information,   31 
whether conscious or not, may still be modality-specific and not available for use on 
information provided by touch. 
 
 
5. Shape as Categorical 
 
There  is  a  line  of  thought  in  the  literature  which  runs  somewhat  as  follows.    Shape 
properties  have  causal  significance.    The  shape  of  an  object  has  endlessly  many 
implications for how it will behave in interactions with other objects.  To understand a 
shape  concept  you  have  to  grasp  something  of  the  causal  significance  of  the  shape 
property.  Indeed, even to perceive a shape property you have to grasp something of its 
causal significance.  This is part of the point of Bennett’s distinction between shape-
blindness and colour-blindness (Bennett 1971).  That someone is colour-blind can easily 
escape detection.  If someone were shape-blind, however, it would affect every aspect of 
interaction with the surroundings; it could not escape notice. 
  The  idea  then  is  that  the  causal  significance  of  a  shape  property  is  the  same 
whether it is identified on the basis of vision or on the basis of touch; the idea is that 
round things roll, whatever the modality through which they are perceived, and that to 
perceive something as round, in whatever modality, you must perceive it as having a 
tendency to roll.  So you might argue that this causal significance to the property can be 
constant across the sensory modalities, even though the appearance of the object varies.  
This  seems  to  be  something  like  Judith  Jarvis Thompson’s  idea  in  her  discussion  of 
Molyneux, where her point is that even the newly sighted subject, if he really is seeing   32 
the shapes of the objects before him, must grasp that the properties perceived will have 
the same causal significance, whether they are perceived by sight or touch (Thompson 
1974).  In contrast, there could be no such thing as perceiving a colour through some 
modality other than vision, because all there is to a colour is what is given in perception, 
and  the  colour  perception  has  no  specific  causal  significance  which  could  be  held 
constant and associated with an appearance in some non-visual modality.  In the absence 
of causal significance, the sensory appearance of the colour is thought to be modality-
specific. 
  Evans developed a version of this idea in ‘Things Without the Mind’, when he 
spoke of shape properties as embedded in a primitive mechanics of our surroundings:  ‘to 
grasp these primary properties, one must master a set of interconnected principles which 
make up an elementary theory – of primitive mechanics – into which these properties fit, 
and which alone gives them sense.’ (Evans 1980, p. 269).  In contrast, ‘no single sensory 
property can be defined in relation to different senses.’ (Evans 1980, p. 270). 
  One way of pursuing this line of thought would be to ask whether the shuffle 
through egocentric space is really essential to Evans’ approach.  His idea was to argue 
that shape concepts are tied to egocentric representations, and that ‘there is only one 
egocentric space, because there is only one behavioural space’.  But couldn’t we argue 
directly:    ‘there  is  only  one  system  of  shape  concepts,  because  there  is  only  one 
behavioural space’?  That is, you might argue that the implications of roundness for how 
you interact with the object are exactly the same in vision as in touch, so you must 
perceive the object as yielding exactly the same affordances, whether you see it or touch 
it; and that is all there is to seeing it as the same shape again.  In effect, this is a form of   33 
the  idea  that  to  grasp  shape  concepts  is  to  grasp  the  causal  significance  of  shape 
properties; the proposal is that this grasp of causal significance is provided by a grasp of 
the affordances of objects. 
  One  problem  with  this  is  that  the  ability  move  and  act  on  objects  in  ways 
appropriate  to  their  shapes  seems  to  be  quite  different  to  the  ability  to  apply  shape 
concepts explicitly to them. There are patients who can reach and grasp successfully, 
while being incapable of successfully comparing the shapes of two seen objects.  And 
there  are  patients  who  are  incapable  of  successful  reaching  and  grasping,  who  can 
nonetheless  correctly  compare  and  contrast  the  shapes  of  seen  objects  (Milner  and 
Goodale  1995).    And  we  ordinarily  think  that  our  grasp  of  shape  properties  is  not 
exhausted by our grasp of causal significance.  An explicit grasp of shape concepts is not 
merely a matter of making articulate the causal connections we implicitly grasped in our 
unreflective manipulations of objects.  We do not think of an object’s possession of a 
shape property as a matter merely of the object having a collection of dispositions to 
behave in various ways, or as a matter of the object merely being disposed to be affected 
by us in various ways.  This comes out very clearly when you think of what happens 
when there is a change in the shape of an object.  Suppose for instance that you take a 
piece of paper and fold it into the shape of an aeroplane.  Many of the dispositional 
properties of the piece of paper have now changed:  it has various tendencies it did not 
have before.  If you really thought that there was no more to the paper having a shape 
than  its  having  such  tendencies  to  behaviour,  you  would  have  to  suppose  that  the 
dispositional  characteristics  of  the  paper  had  somehow  been  affected  directly,  and 
somehow  affected  en  masse.      But  we  have  no  picture  of  how  you  could  affect  the   34 
dispositional  characteristics  of  an  object  except  by  affecting  the  grounds  of  those 
dispositions; and we would ordinarily take it that changing the shape of the paper is 
changing the categorical grounds of those various dispositions.  And what makes it so 
compelling  that  we  have  encountered  shape  as  a  categorical  property  is  that  our 
phenomenal experience seems uncontrovertibly to be experience of shape as categorical, 
not merely experience of a collection of unsubstantiated threats and promises. 
  I  think  it  is  fair  to  say  that  the  current  philosophical  literature  on  Molyneux 
manages only to point, in one  way or another,  to the sameness of the collections of 
dispositions that are associated with the shape properties we ascribe on the bases of sight 
and touch.  If, though, we assume that the shape concepts we ordinarily apply on the 
bases  of  vision  and  touch  are  concepts  of  categorical  properties,  rather  than  merely 
collections  of  dispositions,  then  we  need  to  know  more  than  that  the  collections  of 
dispositions we are ascribing on the basis of sight and touch are the same. We need to 
know that that our phenomenal experience in sight and in touch confronts with just the 
same categorical shape properties, in just the same ways.  And so far, that question is still 
wide open. 
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